Emory Law Journal
Volume 67

Issue 1

2017

Insider Trading: The Problem with the SEC's In-House ALJS
Lucille Gauthier

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj

Recommended Citation
Lucille Gauthier, Insider Trading: The Problem with the SEC's In-House ALJS, 67 Emory L. J. 123 (2017).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj/vol67/iss1/3

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Emory Law Journal by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly Commons. For
more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu.

GAUTHIER_COMMENT_GALLEYPROOFS

10/10/2017 11:34 AM

INSIDER TRADING: THE PROBLEM WITH THE SEC’S
IN-HOUSE ALJS
ABSTRACT
Following the publication of an inculpating Wall Street Journal article, the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has been under fire
regarding the potential bias of its administrative law judges (ALJs). The
success rate of the SEC in its administrative proceedings has raised questions
concerning the SEC’s increased use of administrative proceedings over the
federal court system. Defendants have become frustrated, feeling that the deck
is stacked against them and that the ALJs’ minds are decided before the
administrative proceedings begin. The image of bias has resulted in appeals in
administrative proceedings and federal courts as defendants feel that they have
been denied fair opportunities to be heard. The very appearance of justice is
crucial to the legal system, particularly where the SEC seeks to circumvent
federal courts to conserve resources and avoid overloading the federal docket.
This Comment analyzes the various sources of bias in the SEC’s ALJs. It
then evaluates three mainstream proposals to reduce bias: (1) eliminating
administrative proceedings, (2) allowing defendants to select the forum for
their cases, and (3) establishing a separate appeals board for defendants and
non-parties to raise allegations of ALJ bias. Ultimately, this Comment rejects
each of these proposals for failing to reach the root of the bias problem. This
Comment concludes that the government should adopt a new solution by
restructuring the ALJ system into a neutral pool of ALJs who would be
randomly assigned to administrative proceedings at the various federal
agencies.

GAUTHIER_COMMENT_GALLEYPROOFS

124

10/10/2017 11:34 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:123

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 125
I. BACKGROUND OF ALJS AND THE HIRING PROCESS ........................... 128
A. Role of ALJs in the Administrative System ................................ 128
B. Neutral ALJ Hiring Process Under the OPM ............................ 131
C. Former Selective Certification Process ..................................... 132
II. REASONS FOR ALJ BIAS ..................................................................... 134
A. Are the SEC’s ALJs More Biased? A Deceptive Assumption .... 134
B. Recent SEC Enforcement Trends ............................................... 140
C. Employee-Employer Relationship: The ALJ-SEC Interplay ...... 143
III. SOLUTIONS TO THE APPEARANCE OF ALJ BIAS .................................. 146
A. Formerly Proposed Solutions and Their Shortcomings ............ 146
B. An Independent Pool of Neutral ALJs ....................................... 149
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR A NEUTRAL POOL OF ALJS .................................. 152
A. Implications for the Federal Docket .......................................... 152
B. Implications for the Administrative Image of Justice ................ 152
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 153
APPENDIX ....................................................................................................... 155

GAUTHIER_COMMENT_GALLEYPROOFS

2017]

10/10/2017 11:34 AM

INSIDER TRADING

125

INTRODUCTION
“People generally see what they look for, and hear what they listen
for . . . .”1 Or in the case of the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), its in-house administrative law judges (ALJs) hear what
they have been ordered by the agency to hear. The SEC faces constitutional
challenges to its administrative proceedings and ALJs from numerous angles.2
Its administrative proceeding practices have been the focus of both federal
appeals3 and media scrutiny.4 Most concerning is the claim that the SEC’s
ALJs are biased in favor of the agency.5
The appearance of impartiality at the SEC, a financial industry watchdog, is
critical.6 The SEC is unable to prosecute criminal charges, though it frequently
refers criminal violations to the Department of Justice or appropriate state
authorities.7 The agency is permitted to seek sanctions such as cease-and-desist
orders, bars from the securities industry, disgorgement, civil penalties, and
suspension or revocation of registered securities or the registration of a broker,
dealer, investment company, investment adviser, or financial statistical rating
organizations.8 The impact of SEC enforcement is therefore immense and felt
nationwide.9 In the 2016 fiscal year alone, SEC ALJs issued 170 decisions in
administrative proceedings, resulting in orders for $12.4 million in
disgorgement and $14.5 million in civil penalties.10 From 2013 through 2016,
the SEC charged more than 3,300 companies and 2,700 individuals in

1

HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 174 (Warner Books 1998) (1960).
See Tyler L. Spunaugle, The SEC’s Increased Use of Administrative Proceedings: Increased Efficiency
or Unconstitutional Expansion of Agency Power?, 34 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 406 (2015).
3 See, e.g., Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016); Timbervest v. SEC, No. 1:15-CV-2106-LMM,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132082 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2015).
4 Peter J. Henning, Constitutional Challenges to S.E.C.’s Use of In-House Judges, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/06/business/dealbook/constitutional-challenges-to-secs-use-of-inhouse-judges.html.
5 Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins with In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2015, 10:30 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wins-with-in-house-judges-1430965803.
6 See Office of Administrative Law Judges, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.
gov/alj (last modified Jan. 26, 2017) (describing the role of ALJs as “independent adjudicators”).
7 See Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(h)(9)(B) (2012); OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 84 (2016).
8 Office of Administrative Law Judges, supra note 6.
9 See id.
10 See id.
2
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administrative and federal court proceedings, and obtained over $13.4 billion
in sanctions.11
The current challenges to the SEC’s administrative proceedings include
issues with the Appointments Clause,12 the Seventh Amendment,13 Equal
Protection,14 and Procedural Due Process.15 However, this Comment focuses
solely on one challenge: the potential bias of the SEC’s in-house ALJs.16 While
the Supreme Court has declined to hear cases challenging the validity of ALJs
under the Appointments Clause,17 the more disturbing claim is the possibility
of a biased trier of fact.18 The SEC has been the center of media attention,19 but
that does not exclude other agencies from scrutiny. While this Comment
concentrates on the bias allegations at the SEC, all agencies bringing cases in
administrative proceedings in front of in-house ALJs could face a similar
problem.
Following the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) in 2010,20 the SEC increased the
number of cases it brought in administrative proceedings.21 In the 2014 fiscal
year, the SEC brought four out of five enforcement actions in administrative
11 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Chair Mary Jo White Announces Departure Plans
(Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-238.html.
12 Alexander I. Platt, SEC Administrative Proceedings: Backlash and Reform, 71 BUS. LAW. 1, 14
(2015). ALJs are appointed by human resources officials within the SEC—not by the Commission directly—
and are not removable by the President, both of which would violate Article II § 2 of the Constitution if ALJs
were found to be “inferior officers.” Id. at 14–15; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[B]ut the Congress may by
Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts
of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”).
13 Platt, supra note 12, at 17. When a case is heard in an administrative proceeding as opposed to federal
court, the defendant loses the opportunity to be heard by a jury, as juries are not used in administrative
proceedings. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”).
14 David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1155, 1195 (2016) (“[T]hey are
arguing that the unfair discrimination lies in the selection of their case for administrative proceedings, while
comparable cases go to court.”).
15 Id. at 1197 (challenging forum selection, the jurisdiction of administrative proceedings, and “agency
officials act[ing] as judge, jury, and prosecutor”).
16 See Eaglesham, supra note 5.
17 Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1500 (2016) (discussing removal
issue); Brief of Petitioner, Pierce v. SEC, 136 S. Ct. 1713 (2016) (No. 15-901) (discussing appointment issue).
18 See infra notes 199–204 and accompanying text (discussing the negative effects of perceived bias).
19 See discussion infra Section II.A.
20 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5641 (2012).
21 Spunaugle, supra note 2, at 406 (“The SEC has taken advantage of this expanded authority by
increasingly preferring to pursue enforcement actions in front of [administrative proceedings] rather than the
district courts.”).
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proceedings rather than in federal courts.22 Further, the SEC boasted a 90%
win rate in administrative proceedings, and only a 69% win rate in federal
court, from October 2010 through March 2015.23 Several commentators have
questioned the independence of the SEC’s ALJs given the significantly higher
success rate in administrative proceedings.24
While other agencies may also have biased ALJs,25 public scrutiny has
focused on the SEC.26 All federal agencies use the same ALJ hiring process,27
but only the SEC ALJs receive public scrutiny.28 This Comment argues that
SEC ALJs are still biased, despite a neutral hiring process. This Comment
further argues that this systemic bias should be removed by restructuring the
ALJ program to function as a neutral pool of available ALJs employed by the
Office of Personnel Management (OPM) instead of by particular agencies.
Additionally, the agency’s leadership remains up in the air.29 Ordinarily,
five commissioners, appointed by the President of the United States and
confirmed by the Senate, lead the SEC.30 To prevent the appearance of
political bias, “no more than three [c]ommissioners may belong to the same
political party.”31 Currently, only three of the five seats are filled, with one
commissioner’s term having expired in June 2017.32 The last SEC Chair, Mary
Jo White, stepped down from her position at the conclusion of President
Obama’s second term.33 Thus, the time is now for reform at the SEC.
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I explains the role and hiring of
ALJs following the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to

22

Eaglesham, supra note 5.
Id.
24 See Platt, supra note 12, at 9; Spunaugle, supra note 2, at 413; Zaring, supra note 14, at 1175.
25 See infra Section II.A.
26 See, e.g., Eaglesham, supra note 5 (highlighting the SEC’s success rate in administrative proceedings);
Kimberley A. Strassel, The SEC Plays Judge and Jury, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2016, 7:30 PM), http://www.wsj.
com/articles/the-sec-plays-judge-and-jury-1470353410 (criticizing the SEC’s trend towards administrative
proceedings).
27 Kent Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 VAND. L. REV. 797, 804–05 (2013).
28 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
29 Current SEC Commissioners, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/about/
commissioner.shtml (last modified Sept. 17, 2013).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. Because no individual was confirmed when Commissioner Kara Stein’s term ended in June 2017,
she may continue to serve as a commissioner for up to eighteen months following the expiration of her term.
Id.
33 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 11.
23
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demonstrate the facial neutrality of the ALJ infrastructure across agencies. Part
II examines the reasons behind the bias allegations at the SEC and evaluates
the risk of bias. Part III argues for overhauling the infrastructure of the ALJ
program by assessing four solutions. Finally, Part IV describes the implications
that the reform would have on future agency adjudications.
I. BACKGROUND OF ALJS AND THE HIRING PROCESS
This Part provides an overview of ALJs. Section A details the role of ALJs
in federal agencies. Section B explains the selection process of ALJs as
prescribed by the APA and the OPM, which applies to all federal agencies as a
means of ensuring impartiality. Finally, section C lays out the selective
certification process that was reformed to prevent ALJ biases. Despite the
repeal of the selective certification process and maintenance of a neutral hiring
process, bias continues to affect the SEC’s ALJs.
A. Role of ALJs in the Administrative System
The APA formally created the ALJ position in 1946 to “ensure fairness in
administrative proceedings before Federal Government agencies.”34 In the
APA, Congress carefully described the role of the ALJ to regulate the hiring
process and power of the position.35 Previously agencies used their own
employees to oversee proceedings, and such proceedings were shrouded in
vagueness.36 While there were obvious favoritism issues when ALJs were
former employees of an agency, agencies frequently ignored the decisions of
ALJs and crafted their own with little or no given rationale.37 The APA
intended ALJs to be “impartial triers of fact.”38 “An employee or agent
engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an
agency in a case may not, in that or a factually related case, participate or
advise in the decision, recommended decision, or agency review . . . .”39

34 Qualification Standard for Administrative Law Judge Positions, OFF. OF PERSONNEL MGMT.,
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/classification-qualifications/general-schedule-qualificationstandards/specialty-areas/administrative-law-judge-positions/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2016).
35 Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Federal Administrative Law Judges: A Focus on Our Invisible Judiciary, 33
ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 111 (1981).
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Qualification Standard for Administrative Law Judge Positions, supra note 34. See Lubbers, supra
note 35, at 111.
39 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2012).
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Therefore, to preserve neutrality, the APA intends that ALJs be insulated from
agency employees in charge of enforcement actions.40
The duties of ALJs include “rul[ing] on preliminary motions, conduct[ing]
pre-hearing conferences, issu[ing] subpoenas, conduct[ing] hearings . . . ,
review[ing] briefs, and prepar[ing] and issu[ing] decisions.”41 Essentially,
ALJs function as the agency counterpart to judges in a courtroom.42 While
ALJs lack some of the independence and constitutional safeguards of
Article III judges, they are still held to the same expectation of justice.43 The
SEC describes ALJs as “independent adjudicators,”44 though they are not held
to the same ethical code as Article III judges.45 Article III judges are held to
high ethical standards to preserve “the integrity and independence of the
judiciary.”46 The official commentary of the Code of Conduct further adds,
“[V]iolation of this Code diminishes public confidence in the judiciary and
injures our system of government under law.”47 The mere appearance of
prejudice or bias is prohibited in the federal judiciary.48 ALJs functionally act
as judges in hearing administrative proceedings; thus, they should be held to
the same ethical standards prohibiting any bias or partiality.
ALJs can hear a number of cases on issues as varied as the agencies
themselves. For example, ALJs hear cases on subject matters ranging from
transportation to social security benefits to international trade.49 Despite
hearing cases on niche areas of law, ALJs are not required to have any

40 See Lubbers, supra note 35, at 111–12. Whether ALJs are actually insulated from the politics and
pressure of their respective agencies is another matter. See infra Part II.
41 Qualification Standard for Administrative Law Judge Positions, supra note 34.
42 Lubbers, supra note 35, at 110.
43 Christopher B. McNeil, Similarities and Differences Between Judges in the Judicial Branch and the
Executive Branch: The Further Evolution of Executive Adjudications Under the Administrative Central Panel,
18 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1, 6 (1998) (quoting Barry v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1324, 1330 (9th Cir.
1987)) (“[A]dministrative decision makers do not bear all the badges of independence that characterize an
Article III judge, but they are held to the same standard of impartial decision making.”).
44 Office of Administrative Law Judges, supra note 6.
45 See Code of Conduct for United States Judges, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/judgesjudgeships/code-conduct-united-states-judges (last modified Mar. 20, 2014) (excluding ALJs from the list of
judges to whom the code applies).
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The
citizen’s respect for judgments depends in turn upon the issuing court’s absolute probity.”).
49 Lubbers, supra note 35, at 110.
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specialized knowledge before working for a particular agency.50 As of March
2016, 1,792 ALJs serve thirty federal agencies.51 Given the focus of
constitutional backlash on the SEC, one might assume that the SEC has tens or
even hundreds of these ALJs serving just its purposes. However, this could not
be further from the truth; more than 1,500 ALJs serve the Social Security
Administration (SSA), whereas only five serve the SEC.52
Notably, the APA does not require that all agencies bring actions in
administrative proceedings.53 For example, the SEC has the option to bring
enforcement matters in either administrative proceedings or federal courts.54 A
guide published by the SEC’s Division of Enforcement details the agency’s
approach to forum selection.55 While the agency does not adhere to a strict
formula, the Division of Enforcement considers a number of factors when
selecting a forum.56 These include (1) “[t]he availability of the desired claims,
legal theories, and forms of relief in each forum”; (2) “[w]hether any charged
party is a registered entity or an individual associated with a registered entity”;
(3) “[t]he cost-, resource-, and time-effectiveness of litigation in each forum”;
and (4) “[f]air, consistent, and effective resolution of securities law issues and
matters.”57 The SEC notes that one advantage of administrative proceedings is
the expertise of the ALJs, who become intimately familiar with the workings
of the securities industry and regulations.58

50 See Barnett, supra note 27, at 804 (describing ALJ employment requirements). The selective
certification process served to allow agencies to seek out ALJs with specialized knowledge. See infra Section
I.C.
51 ALJs by Agency, OFF. OF PERSONNEL MGMT., https://www.opm.gov/services-for-agencies/
administrative-law-judges/#url=ALJs-by-Agency (last visited Oct. 1, 2016).
52 Id. For a breakdown of ALJs by agency, see the reproduction of the OPM’s chart in the Appendix.
53 Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2012) (detailing the application of the statute to administrative hearings but
leaving open the possibility that a case be brought in court instead).
54 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT APPROACH TO FORUM SELECTION IN
CONTESTED ACTIONS 1, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcement-approach-forum-selectioncontested-actions.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2016) [hereinafter SEC, FORUM SELECTION].
55 Id.
56 Id. No one factor is dispositive, but the guide notes, “Not all factors will apply in every case and, in
any particular case, some factors may deserve more weight than others, or more weight than they might in
another case. Indeed, in some circumstances, a single factor may be sufficiently important to lead to a decision
to recommend a particular forum.” Id. Thus, defendants have no ability to predict in which forum the SEC will
pursue a case.
57 Id.
58 Id. (“[ALJs] . . . develop extensive knowledge and experience concerning the federal securities laws
and complex or technical securities industry practices or products.”).
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B. Neutral ALJ Hiring Process Under the OPM
The APA itself gives little guidance as to the hiring of ALJs.59 Section
3105, appropriately titled “Appointment of administrative law judges,” merely
states, “Each agency shall appoint as many administrative law judges as are
necessary for proceedings required to be conducted in accordance with
sections 556 and 557 of this title.”60 Therefore the SEC is able to appoint as
many or as few ALJs as it would like, dependent on its needs.61 Further, the
statute notes, “Administrative law judges shall be assigned to cases in rotation
so far as practicable, and may not perform duties inconsistent with their duties
and responsibilities as administrative law judges,”62 although this does little to
clarify how ALJs are to be appointed.
The APA authorizes the OPM (formerly the U.S. Civil Service
Commission)63 to set guidelines and standards for hiring ALJs.64 Agencies are
restricted to considering a list of candidates ranked by the OPM and the “rule
of three.”65 The “rule of three” is a statutory requirement that agencies must
consider at least three names per vacancy.66 Additionally, the agency must
select an ALJ from the top three ranked eligible applicants.67
Because the APA leaves much to be determined in regard to hiring ALJs,
the OPM has the power to craft the relevant hiring standards and procedure.68
Qualification, determined entirely by the OPM, consists of three components:
licensure, experience, and a written examination.69 The first, licensure, is
perhaps the easiest standard to pass, as the applicant simply must be licensed to
practice law in a state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, or any territorial
court under the U.S. Constitution.70 Second, to satisfy the experience
requirement, “[a]pplicants must have a full seven (7) years of experience as a
59

See 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012).
Id.
61 Likewise, ALJs are also subject to agency- or office-wide reductions in force. VANESSA K. BURROWS,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34607, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: AN OVERVIEW 9 (2010).
62 5 U.S.C. § 3105.
63 Lubbers, supra note 35, at 112.
64 5 U.S.C. § 3344 (2012).
65 Lubbers, supra note 35, at 115.
66 5 U.S.C. § 3317(a) (2012); Lubbers, supra note 35, at 115.
67 5 U.S.C. § 3318 (2012); Lubbers, supra note 35, at 115 (“The agency is then obliged to make its
selection from those three who have the highest scores and are actually available for appointment.”).
68 Lubbers, supra note 35, at 112 (“[OPM] has been exclusively responsible for the initial examination,
certification for selection, and compensation of ALJs.”).
69 Qualification Standard for Administrative Law Judge Positions, supra note 34.
70 Id.
60
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licensed attorney preparing for, participating in, and/or reviewing formal
hearings or trials involving litigation and/or administrative law at the Federal,
State, or local level.”71 Third, the OPM administers an examination to judge an
applicant’s knowledge, skills, and ability.72 Beyond the formal tripartite
system, a number of softer factors are also incorporated into the final
composite score, which one might normally expect when applying for a job.
For example, the candidate must allow the OPM to send “vouchers,” or
inquiries, to twenty individuals with “personal knowledge of the applicant’s
experience, professional abilities, and qualifications”—the equivalent to a list
of references.73
Following the examination, each applicant is given a composite score
between zero and 100.74 Applicants who score eighty or above are then
considered eligible candidates.75 The OPM then ranks eligible candidates by
score, which is available for review by hiring agencies.76 Once the hiring
agencies receive the rankings of the ALJ candidate scores, the individual
agencies may make appointments from this list subject to the rule of three.77
The hiring procedures prescribed by the OPM are objective and calibrated to
find the best candidates for ALJ positions.78 However, a neutral hiring process
is not enough to prevent bias when ALJs are placed at and employed by a
specific agency.79
C. Former Selective Certification Process
Initially, agencies were permitted to circumvent the rankings set by the
OPM and the rule of three by engaging in selective certification.80 If an agency
gained the OPM’s approval by showing a necessity, the agency could appoint
ALJs despite their eligibility ranking.81 Many agencies would prove necessity
71

Id.
Id.
73 Lubbers, supra note 35, at 114.
74 Id. at 112.
75 Id.
76 Id. There are two separate registries, one for GS-16 grade level and one for GS-15 level. Id. Most
agencies employ GS-16 level ALJs, but four—the SSA; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (ATF); the Department of Housing and Urban Development; and the U.S. Coast Guard—employ
GS-15 level ALJs. Id. at 112–13, 113 n. 19.
77 See id. at 115; 5 U.S.C. § 3317(a) (2012).
78 See Qualification Standard for Administrative Law Judge Positions, supra note 34.
79 See infra Part II.
80 Barnett, supra note 27, at 805.
81 Lubbers, supra note 35, at 117.
72
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by expressing a need for an ALJ who has prior experience or specialized
knowledge in the relevant field, such as communications for the Federal
Communications Commission.82 From the 1960s through the 1980s,83 eleven
agencies engaged in selective certification, including the SEC.84
However, selective certification was an obvious avenue for agencies to
acquire biased ALJs. A 1974 study estimated that 82% of ALJs acquired their
jobs using selective certification, rather than the traditional hiring process set
and managed by the OPM.85 A 1969 study found that fifty-two of sixty-six
ALJs hired through selective certification were former employees of the
respective agencies, as many agencies found that their own staff attorneys
possessed the requisite specialized knowledge.86
The OPM ended selective certification in 1984 after criticism that the ALJs
hired through selective certification were biased in favor of their agencies.87
The OPM’s official announcement to end selective certification seemed to
leave open a gap: “Where agencies can justify by job analysis that special
qualifications enhance performance on the job, agencies may give priority
consideration in filling vacant positions to applicants with special
qualifications.”88 Several agencies have appealed to the OPM and Congress
under this language for a waiver to return to selective certification.89 However,
such attempts have been unsuccessful.90 Thus far, the OPM has interpreted the
language only to mean that when comparing two applicants with equal scores
following the ALJ qualification process, an agency may choose the applicant
with relevant industry experience.91 The American Bar Association supported
the OPM in denying agency requests to use selective certification.92 By closing

82

Id.
Barnett, supra note 27, at 805.
84 Lubbers, supra note 35, at 117–18. Other agencies included the Department of Agriculture, the Civil
Aeronautics Board, the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
the Department of Labor, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, ATF,
SSA, and the U.S. Coast Guard. Id.
85 Id. at 118.
86 Id.
87 Barnett, supra note 27, at 805.
88 BURROWS, supra note 61, at 6 (citing OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., EXAMINATION ANNOUNCEMENT
NO. 318 at 8 (1984)).
89 Barnett, supra note 27, at 805.
90 BURROWS, supra note 61, at 6.
91 Id.
92 Id.
83
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the selective certification loophole, the OPM sought to end ALJ bias.93
However, given that claims of biased ALJs continue to crop up,94 ending
selective certification did not solve the problem.
II. REASONS FOR ALJ BIAS
While the ALJ hiring process is controlled by the OPM and is identical for
each agency,95 the claims of bias against the SEC’s ALJs seem to be front-page
news while claims against other agencies take a back seat.96 Because all
agencies are bound by the same hiring rules, in theory they have equal chances
of acquiring biased ALJs. However, the SEC remains in the crosshairs of the
Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, and Forbes, while other agencies slip
under the radar.97 Perhaps other agencies just do not have biased ALJs and this
problem is unique to the SEC.
This Part analyzes the reasons for ALJ bias at the SEC. Section A
addresses the potentially deceptive assumption that only the SEC faces such
allegations, though the media’s focus on the SEC demonstrates a lack of public
confidence in the agency’s impartiality during administrative proceedings.
Section B surveys recent trends in SEC enforcement actions indicating a heavy
shift toward administrative proceedings where the SEC could receive
preferential treatment. Section C analyzes how the employee-employer
relationship between the ALJs and the SEC increases the opportunity for bias.
A. Are the SEC’s ALJs More Biased? A Deceptive Assumption
Due to the high-profile nature of the subject matter and the deep pockets of
the parties to SEC administrative proceedings, major news outlets naturally
report on the alleged bias of SEC ALJs over those of other agencies, such as

93 See Barnett, supra note 27, at 805 (noting that the OPM ended selective certification in response to
charges of ALJ bias).
94 Eaglesham, supra note 5.
95 See supra Section I.B.
96 See, e.g., Eaglesham, supra note 5 (suggesting SEC ALJ bias); Henning, supra note 4 (describing
constitutional challenges to the SEC’s ALJ program); Daniel R. Walfish, The Real Problem with SEC
Administrative Proceedings, and How to Fix It, FORBES (July 20, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
danielfisher/2015/07/20/the-real-problem-with-sec-administrative-proceedings-and-how-to-fix-it/#5b88c4bf2e
01 (concluding that the real problem was with the SEC’s appellate process, but still noting the issue of
potentially biased ALJs).
97 Cf. Eaglesham, supra note 5; Henning, supra note 4; Walfish, supra note 96.
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the SSA or the Environmental Protection Agency.98 Other agencies’ ALJs may
face similar bias allegations, yet the media only fixates on such allegations
against the SEC, thus making the allegations against other agencies harder to
follow.99 For example, the SSA was also accused of having biased ALJs in
disability hearings, but these allegations were only reported outside of major
news outlets.100 Allegations of bias at the SEC receive attention due to (1)
recent cases challenging the SEC, (2) media attention on the SEC, (3) the SEC
Office of Inspector General’s (OIG) investigation into the agency’s ALJs, and
(4) other agencies already taking steps to reduce bias in ALJs.
Recent cases have amplified the focus of media attention on the SEC by
vocalizing these bias allegations. While many cases have challenged the
constitutionality of the SEC’s administrative proceedings, the theories of those
challenges are varied and diverse.101 Despite the many constitutional
challenges to date, no court has heard a due process challenge regarding the
impartiality of the SEC’s ALJs.102 However, Timbervest, LLC v. SEC103 led

98 See Eaglesham, supra note 5; Strassel, supra note 26. Large amounts of money are at stake in SEC
enforcement actions. Office of Administrative Law Judges, supra note 6 (“For fiscal year 2016, [ALJs] . . .
ordered approximately $12.4 million in disgorgement and approximately $14.5 million in civil penalties.”).
The actions frequently involve well-known business organizations and individuals. See, e.g., Aruna
Viswanatha et al., Golfer Phil Mickelson Sued, Two Others Charged in Insider-Trading Case, WALL ST. J.
(May 19, 2016, 7:49 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/former-dean-foods-chairman-thomas-davis-chargedwith-insider-trading-143663773 (detailing renowned golfer Phil Mickelson’s involvement in an insider trading
case); Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Merrill Lynch to Pay $415 Million for Misusing Customer
Cash and Putting Customer Securities at Risk (Jun. 23, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016128.html; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Bank of America with Securities Laws
Violations in Connection with Regulatory Capital Overstatements (Sept. 29, 2014),
https://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370543065
483.
99 See Eaglesham, supra note 5; Henning, supra note 4; Walfish, supra note 96.
100 See, e.g., Scott Elkind, The War on So-Called “Outlier” Administrative Law Judges, AM. ASS’N FOR
JUST.: SOC. SECURITY DISABILITY L. NEWSL., https://www.justice.org/sections/newsletters/articles/war-on-socalled-“outlier”-administrative-law-judges (last visited Oct. 29, 2016); Press Release, Gibson Dunn, Historic
Class Action Settlement Provides New Hearings and Protections to Thousands of Disabled New Yorkers
Wrongly Denied Social Security Benefits (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.gibsondunn.com/news/Pages/
HistoricClassActionSettlementProvidesNewHearingsandProtections.aspx; New SSA Ruling Addresses ALJ
Bias, LAPORTE L. FIRM (Feb. 21, 2013), http://laportelawfirm.com/2013/02/21/new-ssa-ruling-addresses-aljbias/.
101 See Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236, 1237 (11th Cir. 2016); Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276, 278–79 (2d Cir.
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2187 (2017); Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136
S. Ct. 1500 (2016).
102 Cf. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927) (finding a right to an impartial judge).
103 No. 1:15-CV-2106-LMM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132082 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2015) (challenging the
constitutionality of the SEC’s ALJ appointment procedures).
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directly to the publication of the Wall Street Journal’s article “SEC Wins with
In-House Judges,” which critiqued the SEC ALJs’ ability to be impartial.104
Among other things, the plaintiffs in Timbervest challenged the
constitutionality of the SEC’s administrative proceedings with regard to the
appointment and removal processes for ALJs.105 While the plaintiffs’ argument
in federal court focused on the mechanics of hiring and removing ALJs, one of
their arguments when appealing to the SEC Commissioners hinged on SEC
ALJs being biased in favor of the agency.106 These bias allegations were
reiterated in the district court opinion, stating: “Based on [‘SEC Wins with InHouse Judges’], Plaintiffs requested that the SEC produce evidence relevant to
the former ALJ’s allegations because those statements were relevant to
Plaintiffs’ due process, impartiality claim which was pending before the
[SEC].”107
While the Timbervest case added fuel to the fire of allegations of
unconstitutionality in administrative proceedings, the Wall Street Journal lit
the flame.108 In the “SEC Wins with In-House Judges” article, former SEC
ALJ Lillian McEwen stated that she was pressured by Chief Judge Brenda
Murray to rule for the SEC more often.109 McEwen asserted that Murray
“questioned [her] loyalty to the SEC” because McEwen often ruled in favor of
the defendants.110 Additionally, McEwen explained that SEC ALJs were to
view defendants as guilty until proven innocent, contrary to the most basic
premise of the American judicial system.111
The Timbervest case mentioned only one of several accusations of SEC
ALJ bias in the media.112 Investor Mark Cuban has criticized the SEC’s
administrative proceeding process frequently and publicly, as noted in a recent

104

Eaglesham, supra note 5.
Timbervest, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132082, at *1–2.
106 See Order Requesting Additional Briefing, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4166, Investment
Company Act Release No. 31749, 2015 SEC LEXIS 3294 (Aug. 11, 2015). Administrative proceedings are
directly appealable only to the SEC Commissioners. Hill, 825 F.3d at 1238. The SEC’s final order may then be
appealed to federal district court. Id. at 1237.
107 Timbervest, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132082, at *12.
108 See Eaglesham, supra note 5.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 See id. (“[T]he burden was on the people who were accused to show that they didn’t do what the
agency said they did.”).
112 Timbervest, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132082, at *12.
105
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interview with the Washington Post that highlighted claims of bias.113 A
different article by the Wall Street Journal also questioned the impartiality of
ALJs, noting, “These judges are hired by the SEC and sit on the
[C]ommission’s payroll.”114 The article notes another high-profile case
challenging the constitutionality of the SEC’s ALJs, Tilton v. SEC.115 In the
administrative proceeding prior to Tilton, the defendant requested a December
trial date upon a dramatic change in counsel in June.116 The ALJ, Carol Foelak,
ignored the defendant’s request twice—first scheduling the trial for September,
and then moving it to October.117 The ALJ warned “against filing any further
‘frivolous’ motions.”118 The article concluded the “SEC gets to sit as
prosecutor, judge and jury—and no surprise that the agency loves this
setup.”119
Following the media firestorm resulting from Timbervest and the associated
Wall Street Journal article, the OIG launched an investigation into the bias of
ALJs at the SEC.120 Then-SEC Chair Mary Jo White requested the
investigation, not just into McEwen’s statements, but into bias allegations
against all SEC ALJs as a whole.121 The OIG ultimately concluded that there
was no evidence of bias, apart from “systemic factors” such as following SEC
precedent and rules of practice.122 Despite White’s request, the OIG
investigation only focused upon McEwen’s claim that Chief Judge Murray told
or in some way pressured ALJs to rule for the SEC.123 However, the OIG
merely interviewed the ALJs by asking them if they were ever directly told

113 Renae Merle, Cuban on His Crusade Against the SEC—and When He’ll Be Satisfied, WASH. POST
(Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/cuban-on-his-crusade-against-the-sec—
and-when-hell-be-satisfied/2016/03/17/619d9e9a-ebae-11e5-b0fd-073d5930a7b7_story.html (“Instead of
sending the cases to federal court, the SEC puts them before an [ALJ] whom defense attorneys have
complained could be biased in favor of the agency.”).
114 Strassel, supra note 26.
115 Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2187 (2017); Strassel, supra note
26.
116 Strassel, supra note 26.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION: CASE # 15-ALJ0482-1 1 (2016), https://www.sec.gov/oig/reportspubs/Final-Report-of-Investigation.pdf.
121 Id. at 8.
122 Id. at 1. See Michael Dvorak, Note, SEC Administrative Proceedings and Equal Protection “Class of
One” Challenges: Evaluating Concerns About SEC Forum Choices, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1195, 1199
(2015), for a discussion of how the SEC’s rules of practice unduly burden defendants.
123 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 120, at 1.
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how to rule.124 This devolved into a game of “he said, she said,” pitting
McEwen against the other ALJs.125 Unsurprisingly, when asked if they were
biased, the other ALJs rejected the allegations.126
While the OIG report did not focus on any sources of implicit bias,127 the
scope of the investigation did include the review of e-mails dated between
2003 and 2015.128 One e-mail from Chief Judge Murray in 2014 noted, “[A]
securities lawyer said that one of the judge’s [sic] in the office is biased against
private companies and he said he would never rule against the government. It
was confirmed by another attorney at the reception.”129 When Murray
confronted the accused ALJ, who goes unnamed in the report, the ALJ denied
the allegation.130
When the OIG issued its interim report on the matter, the Timbervest
respondents were so frustrated with the investigation’s lack of progress that
they filed a supplemental brief requesting an opportunity to submit additional
evidence of bias.131 Ultimately, their chief criticism of the OIG—that its failure
to address the “most significant evidence of bias” rendered the investigation
“wholly deficient”—would remain unresolved.132 This critical evidence was
“the overwhelming success rate of the Division of Enforcement in
administrative proceedings and ALJ Elliot’s unbroken record of ruling in favor
of the Division.”133 As of the Timbervest case, the SEC won in 96% of
administrative proceedings compared to 67% of federal court cases.134 Further,
Judge Elliot ruled in favor of the SEC 100% of the time.135 The respondents in
Timbervest were particularly interested in Judge Elliot, as he made the initial

124

See id. at 9–14.
See id.
126 Id. at 10–14.
127 Id. at 5 n.1 (“[T]he allegations of bias or improper influence investigated were limited to instructions,
directives or orders on how to rule on motions, decide questions of facts or law, or make other dispositions of
any particular administrative proceeding given by the Chief ALJ to the other ALJs without regard to the
evidence or applicable legal authority.”).
128 Id. at 6–7.
129 Id. at 15.
130 Id. at 16.
131 Respondents’ Supplemental Brief in Further Support of Motion to Allow Submission of Additional
Evidence & Leave to Adduce Additional Evidence at 1, Timbervest, LLC, Administrative Proceeding File No.
3-15519 (June 4, 2015) [hereinafter Respondents’ Supplemental Brief].
132 Id. at 4–5.
133 Id. at 4.
134 Id. at 5.
135 Id.
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ruling against the respondents.136 When the SEC requested that Judge Elliot
submit an affidavit regarding the bias allegations, he declined.137 While Judge
Elliot claimed he had “multiple reasons why [he] decided not to provide a
response” to the affidavit, he did not share any of those reasons with the
OIG.138 Then-Chair White requested the OIG investigate the bias allegations
generally, not just those regarding Judge McEwen.139 However, the final OIG
report glossed over potential “systemic factors” leading to bias and only
focused on the validity of the statements made by Judge McEwen.140
Although the OIG concluded there was no ALJ bias on behalf of the SEC,
the public was not satisfied with the answer. When asked whether he was
comforted by the OIG’s findings, Mark Cuban, who won a high-profile case
against the SEC in 2013 and has been outspoken with his critiques of the
agency, responded simply, “That’s laughable. Why not look to impartial
analysis?”141 Likewise, McEwen commented, “[Murray] wins . . . . And the
SEC will continue to do what it does.”142
Further, the focus on the SEC may not be due to something the SEC has
done, but instead what it has not done. At least one other agency, the SSA, has
already addressed bias concerns. In January 2013, disability claimants and the
SSA reached a settlement.143 Thousands of claimants sued the SSA on the
grounds that five of its ALJs in Queens, New York were biased against the
claimants.144 The five accused ALJs reportedly ignored the law and evidence
provided, “bullied” claimants, and disregarded instructions from higher courts,
resulting in more than 80% of their cases being reversed on appeal.145 The
settlement agreement provided new hearings for all claimants who had gone

136

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 120, at 7.
Id.
138 Id. at 11 (alteration in original).
139 Id. at 8 (“Chair Mary Jo White requested an OIG investigation of the alleged bias issue because the
identified concerns could impact all ALJs and the SEC administrative proceedings.”).
140 See id. at 5–7 (“Specifically, the OIG investigated allegations that were attributed to McEwen and
included in a May 6, 2015 WSJ article . . . .”).
141 Merle, supra note 113. The journalist who interviewed Cuban also appeared unconvinced. See id.
(“Instead of sending the cases to federal court, the SEC puts them before an [ALJ] whom defense attorneys
have complained could be biased in favor of the agency.”).
142 Suzanne Barlyn, Watchdog Clears U.S. SEC’s In-House Judges of Bias Allegations, REUTERS (Feb.
16, 2016, 4:57 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-sec-court-bias-idUSKCN0VP2OL.
143 Press Release, Gibson Dunn, supra note 100.
144 Id.
145 Id.
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before those ALJs from 2008 forward, “comprehensive retraining” for the five
ALJs, and a new monitoring system for SSA claims to prevent future bias.146
Further, the SSA issued a new rule just after the settlement on January 29,
2013, increasing the review of ALJ decisions to identify and cure bias.147 The
rule creates three different avenues of review or redress.148 First, the SSA
Appeals Council may review any ALJ ruling, either by its own initiative or by
complaint of a party.149 Second, ODAR Division Quality Service investigates
allegations of ALJ bias or other misconduct proffered by non-parties, such as
witnesses, claimant representatives, and federal courts.150 Third, a party may
file a civil rights complaint if he believes the bias is based upon a protected
class.151 Such reforms may not have the same effect on the SEC due to the
different natures of the two agencies.152 However, the SEC lags behind in
reforming its administrative proceeding structure despite complaints, while the
SSA took swift action to resolve the matter.153
B. Recent SEC Enforcement Trends
The SEC’s enforcement trends provide both qualitative and quantitative
approaches to examining ALJ bias. At the most basic level, the SEC’s patterns
in forum selection may indicate a goal of putting more cases before ALJs in
the hopes that those ALJs will view the SEC more favorably than would an
Article III judge.154
The Dodd-Frank Act induced a shift in SEC enforcement actions away
from federal court and toward administrative proceedings.155 The Dodd-Frank
146
147
148
149
150
151

100.

Id.
SSR 13-1p, 78 Fed. Reg. 6168 (Jan. 29, 2013).
Id. at 6168–69.
Id.
Id. at 6170; New SSA Ruling Addresses ALJ Bias, supra note 100.
SSR 13-1p, 78 Fed. Reg. 6168, 6169 (Jan. 29, 2013); New SSA Ruling Addresses ALJ Bias, supra note

152 Compare About Us, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/agency.html (“We pay benefits to
over 60 million people including retirees, children, widows, and widowers.”), with What We Do, U.S. SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html (last updated June 10, 2013) (“The SEC
oversees the key participants in the securities world, including securities exchanges, securities brokers and
dealers, investment advisors, and mutual funds.”).
153 Compare supra notes 120–142 (describing the SEC’s response to bias allegations), with supra notes
143–151 (describing the SSA’s response).
154 Platt, supra note 12, at 9.
155 See Spunaugle, supra note 2, at 410 (“The SEC’s use of administrative proceedings has rapidly
increased in the years since Dodd-Frank’s passage.”).
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Act expanded the scope of the SEC’s power and authorized new sanctions in
administrative proceedings, such as a bar from the entire securities industry.156
The act allowed the SEC to sue both registered and unregistered securities
entities and individuals in administrative proceedings.157 Further, the DoddFrank Act permitted disgorgement penalties in administrative proceedings,
which could amount to millions of dollars, whereas previously fines were
limited to much smaller civil penalties.158 While the SEC had previously
reserved administrative proceedings for more basic legal issues, now it files
more complex cases at home.159
Given the procedural and punitive advantages for the agency in
administrative proceedings resulting from the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC has
since increased the amount of cases it brings in administrative proceedings as
opposed to in federal courts.160 Prior to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in
2010, the SEC brought approximately 60% of its cases in administrative
proceedings.161 Since the act, the SEC now brings more than 80% of its cases
in administrative proceedings.162 To keep up with the growing administrative
proceeding docket, the SEC hired two additional ALJs in 2014, increasing the
total from three to five ALJs.163 Kara Brockmeyer, head of the SEC’s antiforeign-corruption enforcement unit, stated that the shift toward administrative
proceedings is “the new normal.”164
While the trend toward administrative proceedings itself can only imply
that the SEC believes it will be more successful in that forum, the difference in
156

Platt, supra note 12, at 7.
See Giles D. Beal, IV, Judge, Jury and Executioner: SEC Administrative Law Judges Post-Dodd
Frank, 20 N.C. BANKING INST. 413, 417 (2016) (“Before Dodd-Frank, the SEC could only seek monetary
penalties . . . in front of ALJs if the individual or entity was registered with the SEC.”).
158 Id. at 424–25. Disgorgement is “the repayment of illegally gained profits (or avoided losses) for
distribution to harmed investors whenever feasible.” Id. at 425.
159 Jean Eaglesham, SEC Is Steering More Trials to Judges It Appoints, WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/
articles/sec-is-steering-more-trials-to-judges-it-appoints-1413849590 (last updated Oct. 21, 2014, 9:40 AM).
160 Platt, supra note 12, at 8.
161 Beal, supra note 157, at 417.
162 Id. A broader look at the SEC’s forum selection demonstrates that the popularity of administrative
proceedings has increased over time in correspondence with similar acts broadening the agency’s enforcement
powers. Platt, supra note 12, at 9–10. From 2010 through 2015, the number of administrative proceedings
brought by the SEC increased from roughly 375 to over 500. Id. at 10. However, the jump following the DoddFrank Act represents the highest proportion of actions going to administrative proceedings to date. See id. This
jump is likely the largest as the Dodd-Frank Act provided the SEC with two enforcement powers previously
unavailable in either forum. See id. at 7.
163 Spunaugle, supra note 2, at 413.
164 Eaglesham, supra note 159.
157
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win percentages between the forums solidifies the implication. In the 2011
fiscal year, the SEC won in 88% of administrative proceedings and only 63%
of federal court cases.165 From September 2011 through September 2012, the
SEC won in 100% of administrative proceedings, but only 67% of federal
court cases.166 From September 2012 through September 2013, the SEC won in
90% of administrative proceedings, but only 75% of federal court cases.167
From September 2013 to September 2014, the SEC won 100% of
administrative proceedings, but only 61% of federal court cases.168 As of 2015,
the SEC prevailed in 90% of administrative proceedings, but only 69% of
federal district court cases.169 Several of the SEC’s losses in federal court have
been high-profile cases, such as the action against Mark Cuban, which could
further tempt the agency to shift toward administrative proceedings.170
Contrary to the OIG’s determination that the SEC’s ALJs were not biased,
the success rates of the SEC before individual ALJs and other evidence suggest
that the ALJs are biased. The SEC won 85% of administrative proceedings
before Judge Foelak and 87% of administrative proceedings before Chief
Judge Murray.171 Judge Elliot ruled for the SEC 100% of the time.172
With a recent change in executive administration and the future of the
Dodd-Frank Act pending,173 it is imperative to note that the issue of bias does
not depend upon the Dodd-Frank Act.174 The SEC has certainly increased the
amount of cases it brings in administrative proceedings following the passage
165

Spunaugle, supra note 2, at 412.
Eaglesham, supra note 159.
167 Id.
168 Spunaugle, supra note 2, at 412.
169 Beal, supra note 157, at 417–18.
170 Platt, supra note 12, at 9.
171 Eaglesham, supra note 5.
172 Id.
173 Ryan Tracy, Donald Trump’s Transition Team: We Will “Dismantle” Dodd-Frank, WALL ST. J.,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trumps-transition-team-we-will-dismantle-dodd-frank-1478800611 (last
updated Nov. 10, 2016, 6:29 PM).
174 See generally Robin J. Artz et al., Advancing the Judicial Independence and Efficiency of the
Administrative Judiciary: A Report to the President-Elect of the United States, 29 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L.
JUDICIARY 93 (2009) (providing guidelines for avoiding ALJ bias pre-Dodd Frank Act). Many of the changes
promised by President Trump involve loosening current financial regulations and embracing big banks, but the
SEC will continue to enforce the remaining financial regulations. Stephen J. Lubben, Trump’s Presidency
Raises Questions on the Future of Wall St. Regulation, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.
com/2016/11/15/business/dealbook/trumps-presidency-raises-questions-on-the-future-of-wall-st-regulation.
html?_r=0; Ryan Tracy and Michael C. Bender, Trump Signs Actions to Begin Scaling Back Dodd-Frank,
WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-signs-executive-actions-toward-scaling-back-dodd-frankfinancial-regulation-1486148274 (last updated Feb. 3, 2017, 2:47 PM).
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of the Dodd-Frank Act,175 but the bias problem was not created by the act, and
it will continue to exist even if the act is repealed or dismantled. The APA, not
the Dodd-Frank Act, authorized administrative proceedings.176 The DoddFrank Act merely provided the statistics to highlight the extent of the bias
problem.177
C. Employee-Employer Relationship: The ALJ-SEC Interplay
Because each ALJ is technically an employee of the agency that he serves,
the logistical nature of this setup lends itself to the potential for bias. The areas
in question are (1) payroll, (2) office location, and (3) “duty” to please the SEC
Commissioners.
First, SEC ALJs are paid from the SEC’s payroll, not from the OPM’s
payroll.178 The OPM oversees the hiring process for ALJs, which may not be
delegated to any other agency.179 Beyond this, the ALJs hired by the SEC are
technically employees of the SEC, as they are hired by the agency following
the OPM’s guidelines.180 The OPM sets three levels of ALJ salary and assigns
each ALJ to a salary level.181 Given that the SEC itself is not setting the salary,
it would appear that ALJs could not be biased for the agency to maintain or
increase their salaries. Agencies are not permitted to give awards or
performance reviews to ALJs.182 However, the SEC determines “hours of duty,
travel, office space and procedures, and staff assistance.”183 While this should
be relatively straightforward, one of Judge McEwen’s complaints regarding the
pressures on her as an SEC ALJ resulted from the SEC’s refusal to provide an
175

Platt, supra note 12, at 8.
5 U.S.C. § 554 (2012).
177 See Eaglesham, supra note 159 (noting the SEC’s increasing use of administrative proceedings since
the passage of Dodd-Frank).
178 Eaglesham, supra note 5.
179 Examining Due Process in Administrative Hearings: Statement Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory
Affairs and Fed. Mgmt. of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. 2 (2016)
(statement of Joseph Kennedy, Associate Director of Human Resources Solutions, U.S. Office of Personnel
Management).
180 Id. at 3.
181 Pay Administration, OFF. OF PERSONNEL MGMT., https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/payleave/pay-administration/fact-sheets/administrative-law-judge-pay-system/ (last visited Dec. 26, 2016). Pay
may be lowered for “good cause” following a disciplinary proceeding or upon request by an ALJ. BURROWS,
supra note 61, at 3. While this may seem insidious, the OPM added this option due to frequent ALJ requests
for less responsibility. Id.
182 BURROWS, supra note 61, at 7.
183 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/GGD-96-27, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: COMPARISON
OF SEC AND CFTC PROGRAMS 11 (1995).
176
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assistant and refusal to exceed the per diem rate for reimbursing travel
expenditures from one of her hearings in New York City.184
Second, the SEC oversees the ALJs’ office locations.185 As employees of
the agency, naturally the office location would tend to be within the agency’s
office building. In the case of the SEC, the ALJs’ offices are located on the
second floor of the SEC headquarters in Washington, D.C.186 The ALJs’
offices are not isolated, but on the same floor as the SEC press office and
health club.187 By the very nature of being located inside the SEC building and
sharing a floor with other SEC employees, including a staff gym to which all
employees have access, ALJs spend much of their time near other SEC
employees. The very proximity of the ALJs’ offices to the rest of the SEC
allows for ALJs to come into contact with other SEC staff members, including
the potential for run-ins with enforcement attorneys or the Commissioners.
Third, due to the structure of the ALJs as an office within the SEC, ALJs
have a “duty” to please the Commissioners and other officials at the SEC. The
agency has the power to remove or suspend ALJs.188 Removal is subject to
“good cause,” though Congress did not define what constitutes “good
cause.”189 The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) has the ultimate say
over whether a reason for dismissal was “good cause.”190 Given that a third
party must review the removal, it is unlikely that the SEC would be able to fire
an ALJ simply for refusing to rule for the SEC.191 However, knowledge that
the agency ultimately retains the power to remove ALJs certainly puts pressure
on the ALJs to satisfy the Commissioners.
The ALJs’ decisions are subject to de novo review on appeal by the
Commissioners, leading to further pressure to please the heads of the

184 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 120, at 9. Locality
adjustments are typically respected by the federal agencies, at least when determining salaries. Pay
Administration, supra note 181.
185 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 183, at 11.
186 Eaglesham, supra note 5.
187 Id.
188 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2012); BURROWS, supra note 61, at 8.
189 BURROWS, supra note 61, at 8.
190 See id. So far, sexually harassing employees, refusing to travel or to schedule cases requiring travel,
refusing to deliver legal documents, disregarding the safety of others, failing to meet financial obligations,
misusing office mail supplies, violating agency rules, being unable to work due to disability, refusing to set
hearing dates, and “a high rate of significant adjudicatory errors” have been “good cause” rationales. Id.
191 See id. at 8–9.
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agency.192 The Commissioners may “affirm, reverse, modify, set aside, or
remand for further proceedings,” similar to an appellate judge.193 Judge Elliot
has insisted that there is no pressure from the Commissioners to rule for the
SEC, stating, “The SEC can’t fire us, decide our pay or grade our performance.
. . . There’s nothing the SEC can do to influence us and they don’t try to.”194
On the other hand, Chief Judge Murray told a group of defendants that the
Commissioners, who must approve actions before they are filed,195 do not want
ALJs “second-guessing them.”196 In her own words, “So for me to say I am
wiping [the charges against you] out, it looks like I am saying to these
presidential appointee commissioners, . . . I am reversing you. And they don’t
like that.”197 Therefore, there is some pressure for ALJs to rule for the SEC,
which the Commissioners would support. From January 2010 through March
2015, the Commissioners ruled in favor of the SEC on appeal 95% of the
time.198
Even if the logistics of the ALJ and administrative procedure infrastructure
at the SEC do not result in bias, the appearance of bias remains an issue. The
appearance has come to the point where defendants fear they are unable to get
a fair trial at the SEC.199 Former SEC enforcement chief George Canellos
called for the agency to “end the very grave appearance of injustice” at a legal
conference in New York.200 Another former SEC enforcement official, Thomas
McGonigle, stated that while he didn’t believe the SEC’s ALJs were

192 Office of Administrative Law Judges, supra note 6. Under de novo review, the Commissioners are not
bound by the findings of the ALJs, which raises a secondary issue regarding what the value of an ALJ is if the
Commissioners can later go in and conduct their own decision. Lorenzo, Securities Act Release No. 9762,
Exchange Act Release No. 74836 at 17, 2015 WL 1927763 (April 29, 2015) (“Any alleged deficiencies in the
[ALJ]’s analysis are of no consequence because our review is de novo; the violations we find and the sanctions
we impose are based on our own independent review of the record.”).
193 Office of Administrative Law Judges, supra note 6. Decisions by the Commissioners are further
appealable to a U.S. Court of Appeals. Id.
194 Jean Eaglesham, Fairness of SEC Judges Is in Spotlight, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 22, 2015, 9:25 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/fairness-of-sec-judges-is-in-spotlight-1448236970.
195 Zaring, supra note 14, at 1199–1200. Former SEC enforcement chief George Canellos spoke out
against the Commissioners playing these two roles, stating, “[T]here is a lot to be desired about the process.”
Jean Eaglesham, SEC Ex-Enforcement Chief Calls for Reforms to In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (May 12,
2015, 6:53 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-ex-enforcement-chief-calls-for-reforms-to-in-house-judges1431471223.
196 Eaglesham, supra note 194.
197 Id.
198 Eaglesham, supra note 5.
199 Eaglesham, supra note 194.
200 Eaglesham, supra note 195.
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“deliberately biased,” the appearance of the administrative proceeding seems
to favor the agency.201
Appearance of impartiality is just as critical to the ALJ system as actual
impartiality. The Code of Conduct for United States Judges states that judges
must “avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.”202
The Code notes, “Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible
or improper conduct by judges.”203 ALJs are supposed to function as judges;
thus it is imperative to hold them to the same standard of impartiality.204 The
appearance of ALJ bias has corroded public confidence in administrative
proceedings; to prevent the system from falling apart, reform is necessary.
III. SOLUTIONS TO THE APPEARANCE OF ALJ BIAS
A few solutions have been proposed to combat bias, yet the problem
remains unresolved. This Part evaluates the different proposed solutions and
ultimately rejects each in turn in favor of a new approach. Section A describes
three previously proposed solutions and their shortcomings: (1) eliminating
administrative proceedings, (2) allowing defendants to select the forum for
their cases, and (3) creating a third-party monitoring system of ALJ decisions.
Section B analyzes a new potential solution: an independent pool of neutral
ALJs to be shared amongst all federal agencies.
A. Formerly Proposed Solutions and Their Shortcomings
Commentators and Congress have offered several solutions to cure the
systemic bias of SEC ALJs.205 The first is the most complete fix, but also the
most problematic and impractical: to eliminate administrative proceedings and
force all cases into federal court.206 This solution is so radical that it has not
been seriously proposed due to the number of issues it would create. This
201

Eaglesham, supra note 194.
Code of Conduct for United States Judges, supra note 45 (emphasis added).
203 Id.
204 See Qualification Standard for Administrative Law Judge Positions, supra note 34; Republican Party
of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Judicial integrity is, in consequence,
a state interest of the highest order.”).
205 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 114-697 (2016) (proposing that defendants can opt to litigate in federal court
instead of an administrative proceeding); Walfish, supra note 96 (suggesting that creating an appeals process
that circumvents the Commissioners would allow for more ALJ independence).
206 Joseph A. Grundfest, Fair or Foul?: SEC Administrative Proceedings and Prospects for Reform
Through Removal Legislation, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1143, 1153–54 (2016) (stating that removing
administrative proceedings entirely would be illogical and undesirable).
202
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solution would undoubtedly eliminate ALJ biases as the cases would be
removed from ALJ control.207 However, this would flood the federal docket
with agency enforcement actions, further backlogging the courts.208 This
solution would effectively move the SEC backward by substantially
lengthening the time it would take to reach a decision in each enforcement
action.209 Additionally, this would go against congressional direction, as
Congress explicitly authorized administrative proceedings to preserve agency
resources.210
A second proposed solution is a less radical version of the first: allow
defendants to select the forum for their cases.211 Representative Scott Garrett
proposed this solution in the Due Process Restoration Act of 2015, otherwise
known as H.R. 3798.212 H.R. 3798 intended to solve, in part, criticisms “from
former SEC judges who felt pressure to rule in favor of the Commission.”213
The bill would allow defendants in administrative proceedings brought by the
SEC to terminate the case.214 The SEC would then be able to reassert the case
in federal district court, effectively removing the case from administrative
proceeding to federal court.215
However, this plan suffers from a couple of important shortcomings. This
proposed solution would be much more costly in the long run.216 Part of the
appeal of administrative proceedings is the low cost to the parties, most
especially to the government.217 H.R. 3798 would “decrease revenues by $553
million over the 2017–2026 period . . . [and] increase discretionary costs for

207 Cf. Platt, supra note 12, at 29–30 (noting that the SEC has used administrative proceedings as a means
of “unilaterally assert[ing] its interpretation of the laws”). This proposed solution was offered in the context of
solving various other challenges to the SEC’s legitimacy, such as the advancement of novel theories in
administrative proceedings. Id.
208 Grundfest, supra note 206, at 1153–54; see Platt, supra note 12, at 7 (discussing the advantages of
administrative proceedings).
209 Cf. Platt, supra note 12, at 6 (noting that administrative proceedings achieve results faster than district
court proceedings).
210 H.R. REP. NO. 114-697, at 13.
211 See Jean Eaglesham, SEC Faces “Crisis of Confidence” Over In-House Court, Ex-Official Says,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2015, 3:45 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-faces-crisis-of-confidence-over-inhouse-court-ex-official-says-1449089157.
212 Due Process Restoration Act of 2015, H.R. 3798, 114th Cong. (2016).
213 H.R. REP. NO. 114-697, at 3–4.
214 Id. at 8.
215 Id.
216 See id.
217 See id. at 13.
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the SEC by about $4 million per year over the 2017–2021 period . . . .”218 The
private parties would likely bear the increase in costs.219 Therefore, the bill is
placing a premium on having a fair trial.
Most importantly, H.R. 3798 does not tackle the main issue: the biases of
the ALJs. This bill would simply implement a workaround to administrative
proceedings, rather than resolving the problem.220 Similar to the first proposal
of eliminating administrative proceedings, H.R. 3798 would open the
floodgates to litigation in federal courts, instead of conserving valuable
resources and litigating some of these cases—particularly the cases involving
the most straightforward and routine legal issues—in administrative
proceedings.221 Tom Quaadman, vice president of the Center for Capital
Markets Competitiveness in the Chamber of Commerce, stated that if
administrative proceedings were truly fair and adequately protective for
defendants, there would be no “stampede to federal courts.”222 H.R. 3798 can
only be successful if implemented in conjunction with other reforms to rid the
ALJs of bias for the SEC.223
Finally, the SEC could implement the same changes made by the SSA after
allegations that its ALJs were biased against claimants.224 The SSA passed a
new rule, SSR 13-1p,225 which (1) established an Appeals Council to review
for “unfairness, prejudice, partiality, or bias” in ALJ decisions, (2) allowed
ODAR Division Quality Service to assess complaints regarding ALJ conduct
from non-parties present at the hearings, and (3) permitted parties to file
discrimination complaints.226 Given the different natures of the agencies, some
of these changes would not be as effective for the SEC. For example, no one
alleged that the SEC discriminated against defendants based on a protected
class, as had been a problem at the SSA.227

218

Id. at 8.
See id. (“If the SEC increases fees to offset the costs of implementing the bill, H.R. 3798 would
increase the cost of an existing mandate on private entities required to pay those fees.”).
220 Eaglesham, supra note 211.
221 Id.
222 Id. Quaadman pointed out that administrative proceedings further lack the same procedural protections
as federal courts, amplifying the rush to file in federal court. Id.
223 See id. (noting that initial reactions to H.R. 3798 have included concerns that the bill does not “go far
enough”).
224 New SSA Ruling Addresses ALJ Bias, supra note 100.
225 SSR 13-1p, 78 Fed. Reg. 6168 (Jan. 29, 2013).
226 See supra notes 148–151 and accompanying text.
227 Id.
219
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Still, the ability to appeal a decision to a specified council, not the
Commissioners, would be an improvement over the current SEC appellate
procedure.228 This would address the problematic dual nature of the
Commissioners, who currently act as both prosecutors and judges.229 Further, it
could place pressure on ALJs to rule fairly so that they will not be reversed on
appeal, similar to how there is currently pressure to rule in favor of the agency
to avoid being reversed by the Commissioners.230 However, this proposal still
would not get to the root of the problem that SEC ALJs are potentially biased,
and instead places the potential for redress in the hands of a hopefully
righteous and unbiased appellate group within the SEC.231
B. An Independent Pool of Neutral ALJs
An ideal solution addresses not just the aftermath of biased decisions and
redress for those defendants, but rather eradicates systemic bias in the SEC’s
ALJs. Across all federal agencies, ALJs should be employees of the OPM and
should be used for administrative proceedings based on random assignment to
cases.232 All agencies would share ALJs.233 Therefore, it is less likely for ALJs
to become biased in favor of a particular agency that they worked with because
they would be working with a rotating set of agencies.
This system is comparable to the current ALJ Loan Program offered by the
OPM.234 In the ALJ Loan Program, an agency may request the use of an ALJ
from another agency if the requesting agency is temporarily understaffed.235
Alternatively, an agency may offer the services of one of its ALJs if the agency
does not have enough work to keep the ALJ busy.236 In this Comment’s
proposed solution, ALJs would all be employees of the OPM, and agencies
could submit requests for an ALJ to the OPM.
A unified corps of ALJs has been proposed previously, but with hesitation
about how such a system would be structured.237 In 1983, the Judicial
228

Cf. 78 Fed. Reg. 6168, 6169 (describing the SSA’s proposed appeals council).
See Walfish, supra note 96.
230 See Eaglesham, supra note 194.
231 Like in-house ALJs, an internal appellate system would be subject to the same potential for bias due to
the nature of the employee-employer relationship between the review board and the SEC. Supra Section II.A.
232 Barnett, supra note 27, at 828.
233 Id.
234 See 5 U.S.C. § 3344 (2012); 5 C.F.R. § 930.208 (2016).
235 5 C.F.R. § 930.208.
236 Id.
237 See Lubbers, supra note 35, at 123–24.
229
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Administration Division passed a resolution to support the creation of a neutral
pool of ALJs.238 However, in 1992 the Administrative Conference of the
United States opposed the proposition.239 Nonetheless, numerous scholars
supported the proposal, stating that it would uphold “[w]hat is important,”
being “that the court/corps not be part of the agency on whose actions it is to
sit in judgment.”240
One commentator claimed that despite the appearance of independence by
removing ALJs from the direct control of individual agencies, nothing would
really change in the outcome of administrative proceedings.241 On the contrary,
many of the recent pressing critiques of SEC ALJs would be resolved if ALJs
were not employees of the SEC. If ALJs were employees of the OPM, rather
than individual agencies, they would be on the OPM payroll.242 The ALJs
would not depend on the SEC to set their hours, administrative assistance, or
travel reimbursements.243 The ALJs would not have their offices located on the
same floor in the same building as other SEC officials.244 There could be no
complaints that the head ALJ was directing subordinate ALJs to rule in favor
of the agency because there would be no head ALJ directing inferior ALJs.245
The ALJs would still hear cases brought forward by agencies, but it would be
hard to fathom an individual so biased that he would rule for the government in
all cases, regardless of which agency or cause was at stake.246
This solution makes the ALJs truly impartial arbitrators who are held
accountable by the OPM.247 If an ALJ were deemed biased, either in favor of a
particular agency or based on a protected class, the OPM would conduct an
independent review of the ALJ’s conduct by establishing an appeals board like

238 James E. Moliterno, The Administrative Judiciary’s Independence Myth, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1191, 1227–28 (2006).
239 Id. at 1228.
240 Id. (alternation in original) (citation omitted).
241 Id. (“Would the increased independence of a central panel ultimately affect the nature of independence
enjoyed by administrative judges? Not really.”).
242 See Eaglesham, supra note 5 (noting that having ALJs on the SEC’s payroll creates the appearance of
bias).
243 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 183, at 11.
244 Eaglesham, supra note 5.
245 Id.
246 Contra Moliterno, supra note 238, at 1228 (arguing that even neutral panels of ALJs still “act on
behalf of those agencies” and “are often expected to help achieve agency objectives”).
247 Lubbers, supra note 35, at 124 (arguing that a benefit of a unified corps of ALJs would be the
“enhancement of the perception (at least) of judicial independence”).
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the one established by the SSA.248 Since the OPM already conducts similar
evaluations during the ALJ hiring process, and is therefore qualified to handle
complaints of bias or prejudice, it makes more sense for this appeals board to
be under the OPM’s control rather than under the control of individual
agencies.249 Therefore, the agency would be free to focus only on appeals
relating to the relevant substantive law.
A neutral pool of ALJs means that ALJs may not be familiar with the
intricacies of securities laws when they adjudicate cases for the SEC. However
under the existing structure, agencies are only allowed to consider the
specialized knowledge of an ALJ under rare circumstances: “[w]here agencies
can justify by job analysis that special qualifications enhance performance on
the job.”250 In the past, agencies have requested an exception so they could hire
ALJs with specialized knowledge, but have been rejected by the OPM.251 The
OPM likely would only allow an agency to consider specialized knowledge if
an agency were deciding between two equally qualified candidates for an ALJ
position.252 The OPM has complete control over the ALJ hiring process253 and
has precluded agencies from considering subject-matter expertise in the hiring
process.254 This is indicative of the OPM’s position that ALJs need not have
any prior understanding of the respective area of law to be effective at fairly
adjudicating cases.255
Such a process would not be very costly. It would mainly involve the
shifting of ALJ costs from individual agencies to the OPM, requiring
appropriate adjustments to those agency budgets.256 The additional costs would
be the addition of an appeals board to the OPM, such as the one added by the
SSA,257 and finding office space for the ALJs outside of the agencies’
buildings (which would not be an additional cost if space could be found
248

See New SSA Ruling Addresses ALJ Bias, supra note 100 (describing a similar review process
implemented by the SSA).
249 Qualification Standard for Administrative Law Judge Positions, supra note 34.
250 BURROWS, supra note 61, at 6.
251 Id.
252 See id.
253 5 U.S.C. § 3344 (2012).
254 BURROWS, supra note 61, at 6.
255 See id. (“Agencies were no longer allowed to formally require subject-matter experience.”); cf.
Qualification Standard for Administrative Law Judge Positions, supra note 34 (describing the requisite level
of experience for ALJ candidates, but lacking any mention of agency or industry specific experience).
256 This proposed solution would likely be more cost-effective than other solutions that have been
proposed. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-697, at 8 (2016).
257 New SSA Ruling Addresses ALJ Bias, supra note 100.
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within the OPM’s existing building space). This reorganization more
efficiently uses resources the government already has, while finally quieting
the criticisms of the SEC’s ALJs.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR A NEUTRAL POOL OF ALJS
Changing the structure of the ALJ program affects not only the SEC but
also all federal agencies that use administrative proceedings and the public at
large. As previously mentioned, while this Comment focuses only on the SEC
as a case study, the entire administrative system could be affected by ALJ
biases.258 Section A evaluates the implications for the federal docket. Section B
assesses the implications for the image of justice.
A. Implications for the Federal Docket
Administrative proceedings were created to balance the federal docket by
keeping routine and straightforward legal disputes in-house at the respective
agencies.259 Several of the other proposed solutions failed to truly solve the
problem because they would have opened the floodgates to federal courts,
while leaving the administrative procedure docket barren.260 The proposed
solution of a neutral pool of ALJs, however, would not cause a flood to the
federal courts. Instead, this solution solves the causes of systemic bias and
provides all agencies with neutral ALJs. Consequently, defendants would not
be as opposed to adjudication in administrative proceedings.261
B. Implications for the Administrative Image of Justice
The appearance of justice is nearly as important as actual justice in the
courtroom. A defendant who feels that the judge is already against him from
the moment he walks in the door will continue to feel that the result is unfair,
regardless of how the trial plays out.262 Therefore, as many commentators have
stated, the appearance of injustice in the SEC’s administrative proceedings is
detrimental to the agency’s legitimacy and public perception.263 Improving the
258

See supra notes 148–151 and accompanying text (discussing bias at the SSA).
See H.R. REP. NO. 114-697, at 13.
260 Supra Part III.
261 Platt, supra note 12, at 46–47 (describing backlash against SEC ALJs).
262 Dvorak, supra note 122, at 1220.
263 Eaglesham, supra note 195 (discussing a former SEC director who called for the agency to “end the
very grave appearance of injustice”); Eaglesham, supra note 211; Eaglesham, supra note 5 (“That can create
an appearance issue, even if the judges are excellent, as I have every reason to believe they are.”).
259
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appearance of justice would also likely decrease the number of appeals both in
federal court and to the Commissioners, as defendants are more likely to feel
that they have a fair opportunity to present their case.264
The appearance of justice is crucial to success of the federal judiciary.265 If
the SEC brings cases in administrative proceedings that could just as easily go
to federal courts,266 why should ALJs be held to a different standard? As
Justice Kennedy said, “Judicial integrity is, in consequence, a state interest of
the highest order.”267
Having independent ALJs would placate some of the need for forum
selection guidelines. If ALJs were fair and unbiased, defendants would be just
as willing to have their cases in administrative proceedings as in federal
courts.268 However, separate issues regarding the SEC’s rules of practice may
still leave defendants in want of forum selection reforms.269 The proposed
solution would not change the SEC’s rules of practice; it would only eliminate
the ALJs’ bias for the agency. If the SEC’s process is truly unbiased, as
directors within the SEC have asserted time and time again, 270 the SEC should
welcome such a change to the structure of ALJs. This alleviates the criticisms
of the agency’s ALJs. Accordingly, if the process has always been unbiased,
the SEC’s success rates should not dramatically change.271
CONCLUSION
The SEC is at a crossroads. It can continue to defend its administrative
proceedings and its ALJs as impartial and just,272 or it can listen to the public
criticisms and calls for reform by “end[ing] the very grave appearance of
injustice.”273 Until the SEC adjusts, its Commissioners and the federal courts

264

See Eaglesham, supra note 5 (discussing defendants’ concerns about ALJ bias at the SEC).
Code of Conduct for United States Judges, supra note 45.
266 SEC, FORUM SELECTION, supra note 54 (“The Commission generally is authorized to bring its
enforcement actions in either of two forums—a civil action in federal district court or a Commission
administrative proceeding . . . before an Administrative Law Judge.”).
267 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
268 Cf. Walfish, supra note 96 (noting that “ALJs strive to be fair to all parties,” but are thwarted by
structural issues).
269 Id. (criticizing the SEC Commissioners’ dual role as prosecutor and judge).
270 Eaglesham, supra note 5.
271 See Eaglesham, supra note 159 (discussing the SEC’s success rate in administrative proceedings).
272 Eaglesham, supra note 5.
273 Eaglesham, supra note 195.
265
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will continue to be flooded with complaints that SEC ALJs are biased.274
Further, given today’s era of exposés and informational leaks, Judge
McEwen’s claim that she was pressured to rule for the SEC is likely not the
only claim of that nature in existence.275
This Comment has argued that the SEC must change its current ALJ
infrastructure to remove any indicia of bias in its ALJs. While several solutions
have been proposed, they all have various shortcomings.276 Some of the
solutions provide workarounds for biased ALJs, but none resolve the root of
the problem: bias stemming from the ALJs’ relationship with the SEC as their
employer.277 This Comment concludes that the best option to resolving the
ALJs’ bias is to restructure the ALJ program across all agencies by having all
ALJs employed by the OPM and randomly assigned to an agency for each
case. The implications of this solution greatly increase the appearance of
justice in administrative proceedings278 while maintaining the balance of cases
going to federal courts and administrative proceedings.279 To prevent its ALJs
from only hearing what they listen for, the SEC must resolve the bias
complaints against its ALJs by ripping out the roots of systemic bias.
LUCILLE GAUTHIER*

274 See, e.g., Timbervest v. SEC, No. 1:15-CV-2106-LMM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132082 (N.D. Ga.
Aug. 4, 2015); Eaglesham, supra note 5.
275 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 120, at 9; Eaglesham, supra note 5.
276 Supra Section III.A.
277 Id.
278 Supra Section IV.B.
279 Supra Section IV.A.
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APPENDIX
Agency
Number of ALJs
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
0
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
1
Department of Agriculture
2
Department of Education
2
Department of Health and Human Services/Departmental Appeals
5
Board
Department of Health and Human Services/Food and Drug
2
Administration
Department of Health and Human Services/Office of Medicare
79
Hearings and Appeals
Department of Homeland Security/United States Coast Guard
6
Department of Housing and Urban Development
2
Department of the Interior
9
Department of Justice/Drug Enforcement Agency
2
Department of Justice/Executive Office for Immigration Review
2
Department of Labor
40
Department of Transportation/Office of the Secretary
2
Environmental Protection Agency
4
Federal Communications Commission
1
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
12
Federal Labor Relations Authority
3
Federal Maritime Commission
2
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission
15
Federal Trade Commission
1
International Trade Commission
6
Merit Systems Protection Board
0
National Labor Relations Board
34
National Transportation Safety Board
3
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
12
Office of Financial Institution Adjudication
2
Securities and Exchange Commission
5
Small Business Administration
0
Social Security Administration
1,537
United States Postal Service
1
Total
1,792
ALJs by Agency, OFF. OF PERSONNEL MGMT., https://www.opm.gov/services-for-agencies/
administrative-law-judges/#url=ALJs-by-Agency (last visited Oct. 1, 2016).

